Micah Saul: This project is built on a hypothesis. There are moments in history when the status quo fails. Political systems prove insufficient, religious ideas unsatisfactory, social structures intolerable. These are moments of crisis.
Aengus Anderson: During some of these moments, great minds have entered into conversation and torn apart inherited ideas, dethroning truths, combining old thoughts, and creating new ideas. They’ve shaped the norms of future generations.
Saul: Every era has its issues, but do ours warrant The Conversation? If they do, is it happening?
Anderson: We’ll be exploring these sorts of questions through conversations with a cross‐section of American thinkers, people who are critiquing some aspect of normality and offering an alternative vision of the future. People who might be having The Conversation.
Saul: Like a real conversation, this project is going to be subjective. It will frequently change directions, connect unexpected ideas, and wander between the tangible and the abstract. It will leave us with far more questions than answers because after all, nobody has a monopoly on dreaming about the future.
Anderson: I’m Aengus Anderson.
Saul: And I’m Micah Saul. And you’re listening to The Conversation.
Anderson: How’s it going?
Saul: Not bad, not bad. How about yourself?
Anderson: Doing alright. I’m in Los Angeles now, getting ready to talk to Colin Camerer.
Saul: Congratulations on the second, and I’m sorry about the first. How is LA treating you?
Anderson: You know, it’s really phenomenally special traffic, and the trek out here on the motorcycle was more excitement than I needed. So I’m thrilled to be off the bike and talking to Colin.
Saul: So, Dr. Colin Camerer. Let’s talk.
Anderson: We can’t start this without saying that he started a punk label in the 80s and signed The Dead Milkmen.
Saul: Which is not what you expect from a professor of economics.
Anderson: No, and certainly not from one of the pioneers of neuroeconomics, which is the actual reason we’re talking to him, however cool the punk label was. Basically what neuroeconomics is, is it’s applying a lot of these principles of neuroscience and psychology to classical economic theory.
Saul: This is now our fourth interview. Let’s talk about some of the other themes from previous conversations that might be worth trying to weave in here.
Anderson: Well, I think there’s something that I really want to go after, and that’s something that we haven’t gotten to do before, at least not in any detail. But I would really like to pursue the idea of community more this time. We really should’ve gone there a little more with Dr. More. We got a lot more of that talking to Peter, with Malpai. And I’d like to pursue that again with sort of economic models and discuss what the ramifications of our economic models are on the way we think about community. And who knows, maybe we won’t talk about neuroeconomics that much, but we’ll talk about other things, other ways of thinking that’s led Dr. Camerer to.
Saul: I think if there’s anything I’ve discovered so far, it’s that the conversation never quite goes where you think it’s going to.
Anderson: No, and it’s been fun. The very first conversation with the Reverend Fife, I brought in a sheet of questions, which is something I…never do. Interviews, I like to wing them. And I didn’t look at them one. And after that, I’ve been thinking I’m just going to do all of these without any questions, having done my reading, but to really try to give them rein to go to unexpected places. And as we go through, I think we’ll see whether or not this is working for us. We can revise it, and I can be more directed, if need be. It’s certainly gives this a different sound than a conventional interview, and as this project is kind of weird, I kind of want it to have that different sound.
Saul: Yeah. Totally. I fully agree. I say let’s keep doing it the way we’re doing it.
Anderson: Cool. Well, I’m going to be hopping on the motorcycle and riding up to Pasadena, and then go find Dr. Camerer. I’ll talk, and then I’ll send you some audio, and we can do our recap.
Saul: Have a good ride. Good luck. I guess, talk to you afterwards.
Anderson: For people who don’t know, what’s the five‐minute rundown of what neuroeconomics is?
Colin Camerer: Okay. I’m going to give you an aerial view and then hone in. So, in the 1920s, economists became very skeptical, around the same time that psychologists doing behaviorism did, that we could really understand the details of how the brain or people were figuring what they want or how much to buy, or save for the future. And so there was a kind of conscious move to what’s sometimes called “as‐if modeling,” which means we don’t know what the brain is really doing when you’re choosing chocolate or vanilla or strawberry ice cream at the ice cream stand, but we’re just going to infer from the choices we see you make what preferences you seem to be revealing, and we’ll guess that’s telling you something about the underlying system.
And so from the 20s until recently, the view was we don’t really need to understand what’s in the brain. It’s probably too complicated. If somebody could figure it out it’s really not our job, it’s up to neuroscientists. And economics is doing fine without a more precise idea of what’s being computed.
So neuroeconomics is a complete refutation of that viewpoint. The idea is to say that economizing agents—people—are biological entities. And so the model science for economics as it was being developed and became very mathematized, the model science was physics. The idea was mathematical models of the economy should be like equations that’re going to fit on a t‐shirt. As opposed to biology, which has hardly any equations and just an extremely powerful principle, which is evolution, and extremely careful observation of what animals do in the wild and lab.
So our big goal was really to shift the fundamental guiding analogical science for economics away from physics to biology. And the neuroeconomics comes in because the nervous system, particularly the brain but also body sensations, are the things that are kind of encoding what’s going on in the world and making forecasts and leading to choices. So that’s sort of the philosophical idea.
Part of it is also just scientific opportunism, that the fMRI, meaning Funtional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, looking at real‐time activity in the brain, that’s something that really wasn’t developed until the mid‐90s. So it’s a pretty new tool. But in addition there are breakthroughs really in almost every field. In genetics, for example. And then the combinations of these things become very powerful tools. So you can classify people by their genetic variation and then see by scanning their brains what those genes are doing in different brains, which is what the genes are really kind of designed to do.
So some of it was economists like me who were interested in psychology and behavior thinking here’s a new tool that people are using and we can share.
Anderson: What does that mean for economics?
Camerer: I think what it means is that there are a number of obvious concepts that are important in human reasoning and human nature and choice that are kind of left out of the book. That are hard to formalize, and they’re hard to translate into the standard building blocks of economics, which are preferences (what people want), beliefs (what other people are going to do; what’s going to happen in the future), and constraints (how much money do I have?) You have to map everything into those words, or else you’re not going to be in the 800‐page theory book.
So, things like emotion are not in the 800‐page book. Addiction, consumer confidence. These are things that people talk about, clinicians think about, doctors think about, and they don’t gracefully map into preferences and beliefs and constraints. So the neuroscience will give us a kind of empirical, scientific way to think about those things, and it’ll kind of force flexing the model and adding in some new pieces to explain things. So that’s number one.
Number two… It’s increasingly obvious to anybody who reads the newspaper or stands on an unemployment line that the rational economic model, that people are making the most of their money because they know what they want and how to plan for the future, just doesn’t fit lots of things. So the argument that the conservative (orthodox economists, I should say; intellectually conservative) have made is that economics is doing fine, if it’s not broke don’t fix it, we don’t need your brain science.
But it’s not doing fine. We know very little about complex financial systems and how systemic risk, as it’s called, is computed, and how you would manage policies. And if you look back at the financial crisis, you can either say, as many economists do, “It all had to do with badly‐designed rules,” which may be part of the story; it’s certainly part of the story. Or it may have to do with the interaction of those rules and human nature, like mortgage broker greed, optimism… And you see it not just in individuals who now have houses and foreclosure, but at the highest levels. So, Jamie Dimon from JP Morgan Chase testified before Congress and said, “Well, I guess we didn’t realize that house prices can go down.” And I think he was kind of being folksy humble. But I think that’s really what happened, right.
So the idea that large corporations, or even maybe governments, will solve these problems for us by pulling together the best and the brightest is a thing to hope for and to analyze. But Jamie Dimon and the people who run JP Morgan Chase, they have brains too, and their brains maybe work in a very similar way to the brains of people who are getting Alt‐A liar loans by exaggerating their income.
Anderson: Yeah. It’s funny. One of the critiques of neuroeconomics that I was reading was talking about how basically it’s a vehicle for large bankers to understand and perpetuate irrationality in the market. I was thinking that’s kind of odd because it seems to ignore the implications that they too might also not be perfectly rational.
Camerer: Yeah. Like any scientific technology like nuclear weapons and viruses that have some beneficial advantages, there’s the capacity to use neuroscience to get consumers to buy stuff they don’t want. And the scientists like myself working in universities are not particularly interested in doing that. If somebody else does it, we probably will have the capacity scientifically to also tell consumers how to resist brainwashing. But there is a capacity for using things in an unethical way, conceivably.
So the neuroscience will kind of lay bare the more we understand about people the more we have the capacity to make them do things that aren’t good for them, and the capacity to help them make better decisions. We kind of feel like it’s out of our hands, which is a little bit of a cop‐out. But mostly…it is.
Anderson: This is sort of tangential, but I’m just thinking about general science. To what extent can the people creating it be responsible for thinking about the good or the bad or the ethical implications?
Camerer: It’s such a complicated thing that I don’t think you can really stand back and remain silent. For example, if I thought companies were using non‐obvious ideas from neuroscience to say, market things to children that are really bad for children and which parents can’t necessarily keep the kids from developing a taste for, then somebody seems to be obligated (whether it’s national health or some regulatory agency that’s funding research or a private foundation which has the size to go in there with a lot of money) to figure out what the antidote is. And the scientists will have to be involved. I mean, not everyone will choose to be, and… It could be a relatively mild thing, like the Society For Neuroeconomics, which is a recently‐formed group of a couple hundred people doing this basic science, issues a statement to some effect or forms a committee to say something about it.
Anderson: This is actually making me think of a conversation I had last week, with Max More. I asked him first about the precautionary principle; with any sort of scientific advancement is the burden of proof to show that it’s safe or good on the creator? And he’s espoused a proactionary principle, encouraging development and trying to assess all of the risks ahead of time but always sort of having a focus on new ideas and new development and assuming that you can’t really know any of the implications. How do you feel about approaches like those?
Camerer: I kind of agree with him. One thing that comes out of a combination of computer science and neuroscience a little bit, and applied mathematics, is what’s called an exploration bonus. If, for example, you’re an animal looking out in the jungle and there’s a tree that has fruit that you know tastes good, and then in your wandering you stumble upon a new plant, what the exploration bonus is, it says that even if you think that new plant won’t be nutritious, you should try it. And it’s related to what’s called information value or option value. The idea is if you don’t try that plant, you’ll never know. And if you try it, it might be fantastic. And then you can keep doing it. But if you try it and it’s awful, you don’t have to keep doing it.
Anderson: And if you try it and it kills you—
Camerer: Well, correct. So, there’s a kind of limit to the exploration bonus, right. In fact, that’s sort of the rub, which is if you explore these new things and there’s an irreversible terrible outcome, then you’re in big trouble. This isn’t typically modeled in the literature because you’re usually not thinking about things that’re completely toxic, but it does mean that you need to have a sense of at least maybe roughly the magnitude of the downside risk in trying some new thing.
On the one hand, a lot of people are I think appropriately paranoid or fearful about terrible things happening that you can’t put the genie back in the bottle or undo it, like a pandemic, which could nowadays with air travel and other things circle the globe so rapidly that the World Health Organization just can’t beat it. I mean, we sort of have the capacity to mistakenly destroy ourselves.
On the other hand, we really need to explore (and economists have an interesting viewpoint in this which I think is worth respecting but not betting the fate of the planet on) which is that if there’s a terrible problem and you can make a lot of money fixing it, someone will figure out a way to fix it. This is their view on…even probably many people, on things like climate change. The idea’s that there may be some solution out there that hasn’t been invented yet, and necessity is the mother of invention, so if the times comes— For example, this is a common doctrine of thinking about energy dependence and oil. The idea’s well, maybe we’ll run out of oil, but that won’t happen for a couple decades or a hundred years, and in all that time, some chemist or geologist will figure out something better and they’ll become spectacularly wealthy.
Anderson: So, banking on advances in technology.
Camerer: Exactly. So, there’s a certain amount of almost religious blind faith that somebody will step up to the plate and do this. And I hope it’s true for say, a pandemic. But often, the dramatic things that would be needed just take time, and they’re hard to scale up. If you’re worried about something that’s going to wipe out a large chunk of population in six weeks, you can’t form a $10 billion grant and hire two thousand top epidemiologists and assemble them fast enough to really solve that problem. Things that are kind of slow‐moving crises are things that the economic approach…that’s something that we can hope for, and…I wouldn’t say count on. And I think these historical examples are probably pretty good about that sort of thing.
Anderson: Something that got me into this project is sort of the notion that things are changing very rapidly now, in a way that is historically unprecedented. And they’re happening in so many different fields, and it seems like there are choices that we’re making now that are going to have absolutely tremendous import. So one of the things I’ve wanted to ask everyone is sort of what is the biggest issue of our era that we need to be thinking about?
Camerer: Of course that’s a very good question. I think climate change is part of it. Partly because you don’t want to burn up the planet. But also partly because it’s kind of a test case for how much faith people have in science, how well institutions could respond to these dramatic‐scale, slow‐moving threats. Like, if we can’t do this, then pandemics or other dramatic things that could happen we’re really in big trouble on. So this one appears to be something that should be manageable. If we can solve this, a lot of other things might work very effortlessly.
At one level, it’s just a question of science. Is there climate change, where is it coming from? On another level, it’s political and economic. And it’s transnational because the lion’s share of growth in energy use is certainly going to come from the so‐called BRIC countries, particularly China and India with huge populations. You don’t want to deny them the fruits of development, you know. So their view is, “You guys did this, why close the door on us?” That’s a reasonable viewpoint. At the same time, there’s got to be some kind of communal decision on what to do.
Anderson: It makes me think of choices and the neuroscience of choice, because it’s a question like, we can see this. We know this is something we need to be talking about. And to some extent, we can anticipate it and we could conceivably change patterns of what we’re doing now. Do you think we’ll be able to do it without the sort of crisis that we were just talking about? Like, do we need to have that point where it becomes economically feasible to address the issue?
Camerer: Yeah, I’m pretty optimistic about this one. Partly because there could be a few substantial breakthroughs on the technology side and maybe consciousness‐raising about how people organize their lives. And also, there are just quirky things that are unique to these situations that don’t follow the mold. For example, my read on China is that they don’t want to spend a lot of money for all that oil. Oil’s too expensive. So if you didn’t want to spend tons of money in oil, what you would do is develop alternative cheap energy, like solar. So as I understand it, the Chinese are way out ahead in developing solar energy, and that’s the kind of thing that may benefit quite a lot from large‐scale government subsidy from a government forcing people to do something that they wouldn’t necessarily voluntarily do, in the hopes that in the long run it will turn out to be a fantastic investment. So there may be a few things like that were a part of the solution will come kind of out of the woodwork in a very strange way.
Anderson: And I wonder about the relationship between our ability to address and anticipate a problem and different economic systems in use. You know, with that example in China, it’s not entirely a free market, so the government can say, “We’re going to do solar,” and they’ll do solar.
Anderson: Do you think in a system like ours, it would be harder to anticipate something like that until the crisis happened and then the economic incentive is there?
Camerer: Almost certainly it would be more difficult to say, coordinate on a political solution, if you have sort of a divided American Congress. But I think the early warning systems that kind of gather information and think about it, between scientists, science journalism, blogs, the kind of ecosystem of ideas and facts, is pretty responsive. That’s the good news, right?
The bad news is things are changing extremely rapidly, so we have to respond very quickly. The good news is we can find things out really fast, and potentially respond very quickly. But I think your point is very well taken. It might be that the impediment is not how fast you can get information over the Internet, but whether a polarized population, half of whom might not want to do anything, and the other half wants to do a particular thing or three particular things, can decide if it’s stuff that requires collective action.
Anderson: Something that comes through in all of the conversations I have is sort of an idea of what’s good. We have all of these complicated things that are happening in the present and these different ways of knowing the world, and… I mean, you’re studying how we make choices, but how do we determine which choices are good and which choices we want to make that lead us to a future that we think is good?
Camerer: I’ll tell you the party line in economics, which I kind of agree with in this case, which is if people pick something, unless they were actively misinformed about quality or what the long‐run consequences will be, if they pick something it must be good for them. Who are we to judge? “De gustibus non est disputandum.” There’s no arguing with taste.
That’s a pretty useful principle, because it permits tolerance of a lot of things like gay marriage and using ecstasy to treat mental illness. In other words, you’ve got to be really careful to ban things (that’s our view from economics) and tell people they’re doing something that’s bad for them.
But what’s good? I don’t know. I think the hardest issue there has to do with cultural differences. There are very fundamental issues about social values that may cut across cultures and even within countries that are difficult to say anything about. I will say one thing. There’s been a big boom in happiness research, and a couple of things come out of that which I think are pretty undeniable. Friends make you happy. Correlation is not causality, right? So it may be difficult to show or know whether that means that somebody who’s a loner would be much happier with more friends. But it does mean that if we get caught up in aspects of our daily life that end up shoving friendship encounters to the side, that’s probably a mistake.
Anderson: It’s interesting to think that there’s research on this sort of stuff now. Maybe we can actually come to the idea of happiness or the value of the collective or the value of a social network, and know that with some empirical data. Do you think the trajectory that we’re on currently in terms of our advancing scientific information and our…whatever economic system we currently have now (that I won’t try to define), does that encourage community? Does that discourage community? Or does it actually have no effect on it at all?
Camerer: One way to think of this, this is an evolutionary view, not exactly a neuroscientific one, but neuroscience is sort of enslaved by evolution because that’s where the “neuro,” the brain, came from. A certain amount of community is so basic to us as humans, and other species too, that it’s just a question of what form it will take. So it may be that for example, people don’t gather in public parks any longer like in Italy to play bocce and smoke and drink espresso after dinner. Maybe they don’t do that, but they all go to their solitary rooms and do the same thing on Facebook. So, I think there are probably a lot of wonderful things about face‐to‐face community that online community doesn’t quite replicate. But maybe not. And the other thing that’s going to be new is that the geographical extent of community is obviously much bigger than it ever was, by almost a saturation.
Anderson: Does that give us sort of a glut of a certain type of community? Is it so many that you can’t relate to them in the same depth that you could almost if you were thrown together in your neighborhood?
Camerer: Yeah, that’s a really interesting idea. I think the big winners will be people who were ostracized for cultural reasons and others, who now can reach out and find community. So if you were a gay teen in a small town in Oklahoma in 1950, your life is pretty awful. And so you move to San Francisco, or commit suicide, or get married and pretend. Now, if you’re that same gay teen, your life in Oklahoma, it’s a lot better. And it will get better in the future. So I think people who weren’t quite welcomed as members of small communities before now have a chance. So that kind of community will be very helpful.
Anderson: Are you optimistic about the future?
Camerer: Yes. Economists by training and nature are optimistic. Our view is that when things change and everybody agrees on allowing them to change, it’s because things are getting better. There are some exceptions. But even then one of those I think is instructive; I’ll come back to it in a minute. But if you look at almost the crudest measures of happiness and things that are good for people like longevity, the ability to get out of bad relationships, like divorce for women has been generally liberating. A tremendous number of diseases have either been eradicated or controlled. So by most standards, things are really good.
What’s dragging is the really impoverished part of the world, and the awful part is that many of the poorest places on Earth also have incredible natural resources. And so if you have extreme poverty in a place full of oil, something is seriously wrong. And we kinda know what it is. It’s what economists usually call bad institutions. But part of it is human nature, too. It’s that you have leaders who would much rather have a $10 million villa in Europe than feed their citizens. And I don’t know what the solution to that is.
Anderson: All of these things are sort of materially‐rooted improvements that then have different ramifications to people’s personal lives and how they actually relate. Do you think we are having similar improvements in ways that make people’s lives actually richer? Or is material the only way to measure that?
Camerer: I’m a big believer that it’s a big mistake to just stop at material. Now, first of all, if you’re poor and sick, and I give you some material help and you’re less poor and not sick, you’re much happier, right? So, getting from extreme poverty to contentment and relative safety and security is the number one step. And a lot of that does seem to have to do with material allocations. Prayer and community is not going to solve your problem as opposed to money. And it really is sort of a tragedy that there’s any poverty in a world in which there’s a tremendous amount of wealth at the top. But things are moving in a pretty good direction.
But back to your question, is material goods enough? I mean, one thing which will be a challenge and an opportunity is, as people’s material needs get satisfied, what’s next? Is it community? Is it leisure? There’s an idea from psychology called the hedonic treadmill, that what people really like is new experiences that’re kind of memorable and exciting. Once you’ve bought your fourteenth Ferrari, the fifteenth I don’t think is generating much of a dopaminergic surge.
Anderson: We’ve just been talking about challenges, but really briefly here, what do you think is our greatest challenge going forward?
Camerer: I think the information one is the key one. Because a lot of other things all come from that. Despite all the things we’ve talked about that people think about, if you look at a 1970 world to a now world, post‐Internet, that’s really the big change. Because the pace is so fast. And it forces every single institution to shift somehow. Universities have to figure out what to do with all this stuff. If their job is to convey what’s true to students. Like, every ten years we might have a new what’s true. It changes these ideas of who’s friends and communities and how things interact.
Anderson: I do wonder, are there biological limits to what we can know? Do we hit a point at which we can’t self‐govern because there’s too much stuff coming at us to decide?
Camerer: Yeah, I think there is. That’s sort of the challenge, which is that the human brain is basically the chimp brain plus some neocortex. And the neocortex, we think, is largely devoted to understanding social life, and is involved in what some of us call gene culture coevolution, which is the idea that the way human groups got so successful compared to other species is that we have all these genes that support transmission of knowledge from the previous generation to us. Tool use, books, dadada.
We’re really pretty good at doing that. We’re the kings of the jungle compared to other species. But, the cultural absorption rate was not designed to soak up all the amount of information that a parent and children in school and TV have available. So I think the answer will be some form of the following, which is that knowledge is not located really in individuals but in some sense is a property of the system in kind of an emergent way. So when we say things like, “What do people know?” the correct answer will be it’s not what any individual knows, it’s what’s located in this kind of social network.
What to do with all this information we have, to organize it, make sense of it, is an extremely interesting question, and it has lots of ramifications. One is for history. For example, in scientific citation, I think there’s… I don’t know that there’s good evidence on this, but there’s a feeling that there’s an inadvertent amnesia in remembering not really old discoveries that were seminal, but recent discoveries that weren’t so seminal. So, I have a colleague at another university who said, “I don’t read anything that was published before 1985.” As a historian, that’s kind of horrifying.
Anderson: Yeah. And as a historian of science, there’s an interesting cultural thing that’s going on there. So you look at the history of scientific practice and how that amnesia actually affects what science is doing.
Anderson: You can look at it from the outside and sort of historicize it.
Camerer: Yeah yeah yeah. And it’s nuts, right, because the ability to look back at distant things is better than ever. But at the same time, his point is basically just keeping up with post‐1985 is a full‐time job and so I’m going to arbitrarily just ignore this other thing. What sort of gatekeeping process will pick out the right ideas and kind of aggregate them and get them into the public mind is an extremely interesting question. That one, I’m very optimistic [crosstalk]
Anderson: Oh, you are?
Camerer: because I think there will be lots of institutions and things popping up that are going to be really wonderful improvements. The challenge now is really in data collection and analysis, now that it’s cheap enough to know everything. But again, it’s kind of a metaphor for all the things that’re going on in the world. Information is free, and thinking about it is not.
Aengus Anderson: Well, how goes it?
Micah Saul: Excellent. How about yourself?
Anderson: Doing well, yeah. Just wrapped up the conversation with Colin Camerer.
Saul: Yep. Just listened to it. It’s awesome.
Anderson: I’m glad you like it. It took some unexpected twists and turns.
Saul: It was so clear from listening to the interview that Dr. Camerer is very much just interested in the world. This is a true polymath.
Saul: You talked about economics, but then from there you jumped off into so many different themes.
Anderson: In this case, we only had an hour, and I could’ve had fun talking to Dr. Camerer for…lots of hours. It’s like I hope I will get to talk to him again at some point in life. It was just really a fun conversation. What was a theme that you found particularly interesting that connected up with some of our other interviewees, or something that you’d want to develop more?
Saul: Well, absolutely the first thing that jumped out at me was, I think Reverend Fife talked a little bit about the Internet and sort of the glut of information that we have. But I think that’s going to be a theme we’re going to be coming back to a lot, and Dr. Camerer was definitely the first to really go into that, I thought.
Anderson: I liked his approach as sort of coming from biology and neuroscience to really thinking about, what are the brain’s limits?
Saul: …actually handle?
Anderson: Yeah. And as a guy who studies choice, it’s really intriguing to talk to him about that. So from this conversation, what are things that you’d want to pursue in another direction?
Saul: The concept of information overload is something that I’m expecting to see a lot in our conversations, and now that it’s been brought up I think that is something that we need to be thinking about. We have so much information available, it’s really hard to look at anything other than the immediate.
Anderson: Yeah. So we run into both the limits of biology and also the social implications, maybe biological/social implications, of our media technologies.
Saul: That’s something that we definitely need to be talking about. That’s the beauty of this project. We can now just carry that theme forward.
Anderson: Well, let’s think about those things, and let’s also try to get some more listeners on the web site.
That was Dr. Colin Camerer, recorded on the CalTech campus in Pasadena, California, on May 11, 2012.
Anderson: So thanks for listening. I’m Aengus Anderson.
Saul: And I’m Micah Saul.
This interview at the Conversation web site, with project notes, comments, and taxonomic organization specific to The Conversation.